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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This appeal arises out a final judgment by the trial court on the issue of whether the
Appellant, THOMPSON DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company
(hereinafter "Thompson Development") is entitled to the agricultural exemption for its farmland
as provided under I.e. § 63-604 for the tax years 2009 and 2010. While several issues were
raised by the Respondent during the proceedings below, the trial court made its determination
based upon the issue of zoning, finding that the local zoning ordinance prohibited agricultural
use on the farmland and therefore no exemption could be granted. Appellant argues that the
zoning does not prohibit agricultural use of the farmland, and in the alternative, if the zoning
ordinance is found to prohibit agricultural use, such prohibition is a violation of Thompson
Development's due process rights and therefore is invalid.
B. Course ofProceedings and Disposition.

Thompson Development appealed its 2009 tax assessment, which denied the agricultural
exemption for a portion of its farmland, to the Latah County Board of Equalization (hereinafter
"BOE"). A hearing was held in front of the BOE for the 2009 assessment on June 29, 2009. (R.
Vol. II, pg. 228) The BOE upheld the Assessor's denial of the agricultural exemption and
Thompson Development appealed to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals (hereinafter "BTA"). BTA
held a hearing on the matter and issued a final decision and order upholding the BOE's decision
for the 2009 tax year. BTA's decision however was not rendered until after the deadline for
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contesting the 2010 tax year assessments. The County again denied the agricultural exemption
for the same portion of Thompson Development's property for tax year 2010. Thompson
Development appealed the 2010 tax assessment to the BOE and a hearing was held on July 12,
2010. Because BTA had not made a decision on the 2009 tax year appeal, the BOE again denied
the exemption for 2010. The BTA then issued a decision dated July 12,2010, affirming the
BOE's decision and denying the agricultural exemption. (R. Vol. I, pg. 21) Thompson
Development then filed two Petitions for Judicial Review on August 20, 2010: one appealing
BTA's decision for the 2009 tax year (Latah County Case No. 2010-00890); and the other
appealing the BOE's decision for the 2010 tax year (Latah County Case No. 2010-00891). The
Petitions were consolidated by the trial court on December 22, 2010. (R. Vol. I, pg. 50)
Thompson Development and the Respondent both filed motions for summary judgment with the
trial court on December 22,2010 and December 23, 2010, respectively. Multiple hearings were
held on the motions and ultimately the trial court rendered a decision granting summary
judgment to the County and denying Thompson Development the agricultural exemption on June
30,2011. A Notice of Appeal was timely filed and the issue is now before this Court.
C. Statement of Facts
The Thompson family has owned and farmed hundreds of acres in and adjacent to the City
of Moscow for well over 50 years, including the farmland that is the subject of this appeal. (R. Vol.
II, pg. 218, P. 9) The farmland in question is part of a platted subdivision approved by the City
of Moscow in 2008 and slated to be ultimately developed and sold for residential building lots,
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commonly known as Phases I-III ofIndian Hills VI Addition to the City of Moscow. See
Appendix A for a copy of the recorded plat. (R. Vol. I, pgs. 77-78) All three phases are
contiguous, adjacent, and connected to one another and combined total approximately 13.88
acres in size as of January 1,2009, and 15.97 acres in size as of January 1,2010. 1 (R. Vol. I, pg.
74, P. 6) See Appendix B for an illustration of the farmland in Indian Hills VI Addition. (R. Vol.
II, pg. 199) Additionally, these approximately 15 acres are contiguous, adjacent, and connected
to nearly four hundred acres of property owned and farmed by the Thompson family, principals
and predecessors in interest to Thompson Development. (R. Vol. I, pg. 74, P. 7)
The County denied the agricultural exemption on the 31 lots in Phase I still owned by
Thompson Development (of the original 39 lots). (R. Vol. I, pg. 33) These 31 lots have a
combined total area of 4.91 acres. The 4.91 acres so identified by the County are hereafter
referred to as the "Target Property," and the combined three phases, including the Target
Property, and constituting approximately 15 acres, are hereafter referred to as the "Entire
Property." The County assessed additional tax on the Target Property based on a residential
valuation, without the benefit of the agricultural exemption, and Thompson Development paid
the County $59,476.48, over and above the amount it otherwise would have been required to pay
if the agricultural exemption had been recognized. (R. Vol. I, pg. 75, P. 19)

I As of December 31, 2008, the Petitioner owned 13.8 acres, consisting of Phase I lots and the majority of Phase II
and Phase III lots. Approximately 9 parcels were inadvertently left out of the December 31, 2008 deed and were
later conveyed to the Petitioner upon discovery in 2009. Further, seven lots were sold in the subdivision from 2008
through December 31, 2009. As of January I, 2009, the Petitioner owned 13.88 acres. Additional lots were
conveyed to Petitioner in September 2009, resulting in Petitioner owning 15.97 acres as of January I, 2010. The
Petitioner's principals and related family businesses own the adjacent approximately 400 acres.
(R. Vol. I, pg.,
74).
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Although infrastructure improvements have been installed in a portion of the Target
Property, Thompson Development used, prepared, and dealt with the entire 15 acre parcel in
customary and reasonable fashion for agricultural purposes during relevant times in 2008 through
2010. Thompson Development and its principals and predecessors in interest have farmed the
property, along with approximately 400 adjacent acres of ground, for over 50 years. (R. Vol. I, pg.
74, P. 7) (R. Vol. II, pg. 218, P. 9) In early 2008, Thompson Development sought and obtained
approval for phased development of the ground, and began some preparatory development work
and sold a few lots. Thompson DeVelopment has continued to view and use the remaining lots as
farm ground, with some intermittent, forward-looking preparatory work being done for future
residential use in and around farming cycles and farming operations. The infrastructure
improvements performed on the 4.91 acres denied by the County, were done at times when no
specific agricultural work was needed during customary agricultural cycles. Ultimately, the ground
was properly prepped and crops were ultimately farmed, on the property during relevant times, and
the ground qualified for the exemption. (R. Vol. 1, pgs. 74-75)
The infrastructure work that was done to improve the public rights of way located in the
Target Property consisted of paving the public streets, and installing sidewalks and utilities
within the rights of way (which are not owned by Thompson Development and therefore are not
part of the Target Property) and to the lot boundaries in the Target Property. (R. Vol. II, pg. 187,
P. 6-7) None of the infrastructure improvements installed in the Target Property interfere with
the typical farming operations of Thompson Development. (R. Vol. II, pg. 187, P. 6-8)
Thompson Development directed the contractor installing the improvements to be sure to leave
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the Target Property ground in proper condition to continue the traditional farming operations that
had been done there and would continue to be done there. (R. Vol. I, pg. 74, P. 10) In the fall of
2008, the Target Property, like the rest of the Entire Property, was prepared for spring planting in
customary fashion. That fall, Thompson Development chisel plowed most of the Entire
Property, including the Target Property, in further preparation for spring planting and also to
help contain runoff, all of which are customary farming practices and purposes. In the spring of
2009, the Entire Property was planted in spring wheat. In the summer of2009, the Entire
Property spring wheat was harvested. In the fall of2009, the stubble was left standing on the
Entire Property for erosion control as is a customary practice. In the spring of 20 10,
approximately five acres, including the Target Property, was seeded to grass for grass-hay
production, and the remainder of the Entire Property was planted in peas. (R. Vol. I, pgs. 74-75,
Ps. 11-18)
In the summer of 2010, the approximately five acres seeded to grass-hay was not cut
because feed hay is not customarily cut the first year in order to allow for proper plant
development. (R. Vol. I, pg. 75, P. 17) In 2010, the remainder of the Entire Property was
harvested.
The County has never alleged or stated that the Target Property failed to produce a yield
of grain or feed crops for tax years 2009 and 2010.
It is undisputed that Target Property consists of three separate zoning designations:

Moderate-Density Residential, Medium-Density Residential and Multiple-Family Residential under
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the City of Moscow Zoning Code. Thompson Development recorded two different sets of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions to represent the zoning designations. Both sets of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, recognize Thompson Development's right to continue
agricultural use of each lot up until the time it is transferred to a buyer for residential purposes.
In relevant part, they provide: "Each owner of each lot hereby acknowledges that it is adjacent to
farmland and that Declarant intends to continue to farm said farmland for the foreseeable future.
Each owner further agrees not to take any action that would impede the Declarant's farming
operation." (R. Vol. I, pg. 82, Art. III, P. 3; pg. 89, Art. III, P. 2) The covenants further state
that the Declarant [Thompson Development] reserved the right to farm the adjacent property:
"FURTHERMORE, it is understood that the Declarant owns the adjacent farmland and may
develop said land. In the meantime, however, Declarant shall continue farming the land. Lot
owners agree not to impede in the development or farming ofthe land by the Declarant." (R.
Vol. I, pg. 87, Art. VIII, P. 4; pg. 94, Art. VIII, P. 4)
The trial court determined that the City of Moscow's Zoning Code prohibited agricultural
use of the Target Property based upon its zoning designations. The City of Moscow's Zoning
Code states in part that the zoning code is an exclusive zoning ordinance, "wherein the stated
uses are the only uses which are permitted in each zoning district." (Title 4, Sec.II-5, Moscow
Zoning Code) Agricultural use is not a specifically permitted use under the Target Property's
zoning designations. (Title 4, Sections 2-6 (B), 2-7 (B), 2-8 (B), Moscow Zoning Code) The City
of Moscow's Zoning Code also has a provision for legal non-conforming uses, which states that
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the use cannot be discontinued for a period of more than 30 days or the right to the continued use
is extinguished. (Title 4, Section 1-8, Moscow Zoning Code)
The City's Zoning Administrator, Bill Belknap, determined that Thompson Development
was not in violation of the City of Moscow's Zoning Code because any period of
'discontinuance' referred to in 2008, was not dissimilar from common and typical agricultural
practices. (R. Vol. II, pg. 224, P. 3) Mr. Belknap explained: "Further, no new use was established
that formally extinguished the prior historical agricultural use." Id.
The County originally represented to Thompson Development's legal counsel that the
Target Property would be given the agricultural exemption if the Target Property was farmed.
(R. Vol. I, pgs. 99-100, P. 2-4) The property was farmed, and the County subsequently denied

the agricultural exemption.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Was the Target Property actively devoted to agriculture and therefore entitled to
the agricultural exemption under Idaho Code §§ 63-602K and 63-604 for tax
years 2009 and 201 O?

II.

Does the City of Moscow's Zoning Code prohibit agricultural use of the Target
Property and therefore prevent Thompson Development from qualifYing for the
agricultural exemption?

III.

Does application of the City of Moscow's Zoning Code violate Thompson
Development's due process rights?
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IV.

Whether or not the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Thompson
Development an agricultural exemption on the Target Property.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case is an appeal of the grant of a summary judgment motion. "On an appeal from the
grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard
used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Boise Tower Assoc., LLC v.
Hogland. 147 Idaho 774, 779 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate" if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c) If the evidence presented shows no disputed issues of material
fact, then all that remains are questions of law, over which this Court exercises free review.
Mendenhall v. Aldous. 146 Idaho 434, 436 (2008). "The Supreme Court exercises free review
over issues of statutory interpretation." Taylor v. Maile. 146 Idaho 705, 711 (2009).
ARGUMENT
I.

The Target Property was actively devoted to agriculture and was entitled to

the agricultural land exemption under Idaho Code §§63-602K and 63-604 for tax years
2009 and 2010.

Idaho Code § 63-602K identifies property exempt from taxation, including the
speculative portion of land actively devoted to agriculture. Idaho Code § 63-604 defines' land
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actively devoted to agriculture' and sets forth additional requirements for the exemption, stating
in relevant part as follows:
(1) For property tax purposes, land which is actively devoted to agriculture shall
be eligible for appraisal, assessment and taxation as agricultural property each
year it meets one (1) or more of the following qualifications:

(a) The total area of such land, including the homesite, is morc than five (5)
contiguous acres, and is actively devoted to agriculture which means:
(i) It is used to produce field crops including, but not limited to, grains, feed
crops, fruits and vegetables;
(7) As used in this section:

(a) "Contiguous" means being in actual contact or touching along a boundary or at a
point, except no area of land shall be considered not contiguous solely by reason of a
roadway or other right-of-way.
I.C. § 63-604.

A.

Total Area Requirement

It is undisputed by the County that the Entire Property exceeds 10 acres in total area. In

determining whether farmland meets the threshold of five acres, adjacent, contiguous acreage
can be included.
The County unilaterally attempted to carve out, or target, the Target Property and
consider it separately from the rest of the Entire Property for the purposes of the agricultural
exemption without lawful effect or justification. The Target Property is clearly contiguous with
the rest of the Entire Property. '''Contiguous,' means being in actual contact or touching along a
boundary or at a point, except "no area of land shall be considered not contiguous solely by
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reason of a roadway or other right-of-way."" I.C. § 63-604(7)(a) The Target Property is in
actual contact with and touches the remainder of the Entire Property at several points and along
several boundary segments. (See Appendix A, also R. Vol. I, pg. 77) Additionally, the County
has not challenged the overall accuracy of the map and its depiction of contiguous lands.
Finally, Appendix A is a self-authenticating record of survey kept in the records of the Latah
County Recorder.
The designation of the Target Property as part of "Phase I" by Thompson Development
and the County is solely for the purposes of the future residential development use ofthe
property, and the designation of assessment parcels by the County is for the convenience of the
Assessor. Neither purpose for the artificial targeting and segregation of the Target Property is
determinative under I.C. § 63-604. Nowhere in the definition of contiguous acreage or the five
acre requirement does section 63-604 state that the property must also be designated all within
one Assessor parcel designation or subdivision designation. In fact, the legislature in 2006
amended section 63-604, in part, by adding subsection 6 to prevent these sorts of development
designations from defeating the agricultural exemption. Subsection 6 provides: "For purposes of

this section, the act of platting land actively devoted to agriculture does not, in and of itself,
cause the land to lose its status as land being actively devoted to agriculture if the land otherwise
qualifies for the exemption under this section." I.C. § 63-604(6) (emphasis added) The
legislature also included the same language in I.C. § 63-602K(2). Therefore, designations made
for future residential development use are not controlling for the purposes ofI.C. § 63-604, and
the Target Property is not separate from the Entire Property. The 5-acre issue is a red herring.
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Adopting the County's argument on this issue would lead to absurd results. If the County
were allowed to simply designate areas of ground less than 5 acres in size as separate parcels and
deny the exemption, then the entire statutory scheme established by the legislature would be
obliterated, and the result would be absurd. The County could, by fiat, designate a 100-acre
perfectly square portion of farm ground as being 25 parcels 4 acres in size, and therefore destroy
the exemption for an entire 100-acre parcel that should otherwise be exempt under the legislative
framework. "Rules of statutory construction dictate that a reviewing court shall not interpret a
statute in a manner that leads to an absurd result." State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho
520,535 (2010) (citing In re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 680 (2008))
Further, it appears the County denied the agricultural exemption on the Target
Property because infrastructure improvements had been installed in that portion of the
subdivision. Because of the infrastructure improvements and platting, the County claims
that the use of the Target Property is predominantly residential, even though the Target
Property had never been used for residential purposes. Fortunately for this Court, Idaho
Code § 63-604 is unambiguous.
While not controlling, prior decisions from the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals
support Thompson Development's case. First, the presence of infrastructure
improvements has no bearing on whether or not an agricultural exemption should be
granted. The final decision and order of the BTA in the matter ofIdaho Trust Deeds,
LLC, makes it clear that lots in an improved subdivision are eligible for an agriculture
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exemption. In fact, that matter is very similar to this case. In that matter, the subject
property was "25 "unsold" residential lots in two (2) newer subdivisions." (See Appendix
C, also R. Vol. I, pg. 107) The County in that matter granted an agricultural exemption on
21 lots, finding that they "had a boundary line, or point in contact, in common with other
same-ownership land where the total area involved was over five (5) acres." There were
four other lots, however, that were separated from the 21 lots by a publicly dedicated
street. The County determined that those four lots were not exempt because they were
less than five (5) acres, and they were not contiguous to the other 21 lots. The BTA,
however, determined that those four lots were entitled to the agricultural exemption
stating in part, "Lots in the same ownership were located directly across the street, which
all taken together, totaled over five (5) acres in size. Where these "contiguous lots" were
farmed in an otherwise qualifying manner, they should be granted the agricultural
exemption." Id.
While the BTA in that matter specifically focused on the contiguous argument, it
also found that "platted roadways within the subdivision are developed and owned by the
government" just as is the case here. Id. The subdivision improvements in that matter
included the improved streets and utility lines within the roadways. In its decision, the
BTA found that "The record provided the subject lots were farmed over their surface
area. There was no indication that subdivision improvements prevented farming." Id.
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While the County raised the argument that the lots in Phase I of Indian Hills VI Addition
were "separate

not contiguous to--Phases 2 and 3." (R. Vol. I, pg. 129, P. 2), the record shows

that is clearly not the case. With respect to the land in Phases II and III, the County contradicted
itself when it acknowledged: "This land is adjacent to the lots in Phase 1." (R. Vol. I, pg. 127, P.
1)

Because Phase I is adjacent to and touching Phase II and Phase III and they combined
consist of over 10 acres of common ownership, the 5-acre threshold requirement of the lead in
portion of section 63-604(a) is met. Further, the existence of subdivision improvements has no
bearing on whether or not the lots were farmed.

B.

Production ofField Crops

Theodore C. Thompson, a principal of Thompson Development, is a 35-year farmer on
the Palouse region, with detailed and intimate knowledge of customary and acceptable farming
practices on the Palouse region, as well as markets in and definitions of relevant crops. (R. Vol.
I, pg. 73; pg. 75, P. 20) He is therefore qualified and competent to testify that the spring wheat
planted in 2009 and the hay planted in 2010 are respectively a grain and a feed crop. (R. Vol. I,
pg. 75, P. 21) He is also qualified to testifY that the ground preparation conducted in the fall of
2008 was within the range of usual and customary ground preparation in anticipation of crops to
be planted in the spring. (R. Vol. I, pg. 74, P. 11) This activity in 2008 qualifies as "actively
devoted to agriculture." Roeder Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization of Ada County, 136 Idaho
809, 814 (2001) (holding that fall ground preparation in the year before the tax year in question
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left the property "actively devoted to agriculture" even though there was no crop actually in the
ground on January 1 of the tax year in question). Therefore, section 63-604(a)(1) is satisfied.
Additionally, any arguments by the County attempting to allege that the crops were not
part of a "bona fide" farming operation would be without merit, irrelevant, and would border on
frivolous, as Roeder Holdings also made it clear that such a standard was not part of the clear
statutory framework, which must control the analysis. Roeder at 813-14. The statute simply
requires the planting of a crop, including preparation under the interpretation of Roeder

Holdings. The statute has been satisfied.
C.

Covenants Do Not Prohibit Agricultural Use

The covenants applicable to the Target Property recognize Thompson Development's
right to continue agricultural use of the Target Property. In relevant part, they provide: "Each
owner of each lot hereby acknowledges that it is adjacent to farmland and that Declarant intends
to continue to farm said farmland for the foreseeable future. Each owner further agrees not to
take any action that would impede the Declarant's farming operation." (R. Vol. I, pg. 82, Art.
III, P. 3; pg. 89, Art. III, P. 2 ) The covenants further state that the Declarant [Thompson
Development] reserved the right to farm the adjacent property: "FURTHERMORE, it is
understood that the Declarant owns the adjacent farmland and may develop said land. In the
meantime, however, Declarant shall continue farming the land. Lot owners agree not to impede
in the development or farming of the land by the Declarant." (R. Vol. I, pg. 87, Art. VIII, P. 4;
pg. 94, Art. VIII, P. 4)
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At some point in the proceedings below, the County and the trial court made reference to
the language of the Covenants, and argued that Article III ~2 of the Covenants (R. Vol. I, pg. 89)
constitutes a restriction contrary to I.C. § 63-604(2). However, when reading covenants, the
Idaho courts apply ordinary rules of contract construction. Best Hill Coalition v. HALKO, LLC,
144 Idaho 813, 817 (2007). In construing a contract, the Court must seek to give effect to the
intention of the parties, which is to be determined by viewing the contract as a whole and in its
entirety. Clear Lakes Trout Co. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120 (2005).
The clear meaning and intention behind the Covenants, when considered in their entirety,
is to recognize and allow agricultural use of each portion of the Target Property up until
transferred to an end-user for residential use, in which case, the Covenants provide restrictions
regarding the type of residential structure, as required by the City of Moscow during the platting
process. (R. Vol. I, pg. 75, P. 22-23) Although not binding on this Court, the BTA recognized
this clear and common-sense understanding of the Covenants, at page 7 of its decision in this
matter, stating "The record did not demonstrate a clear prohibition to the continued cropland use
(agricultural use) of the subject lots as of January 1,2009, or subsequent to platting." (R. Vol. I,
pg. 19, P. 4) This clear and common-sense understanding also comports with the understanding
and intention of Thompson Development. (R. Vol. I, pg. 75, P. 25)
This understanding is also consistent with and mandated by the Idaho courts' strict
interpretation of restrictive covenants. Restrictive covenants are "disfavored" by the Idaho
courts. Best Hill Coalition v. HALKO, LLC, 144 Idaho 813, 817 (2007); Pinehaven Planning
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Bd. v. Brooks, l38 Idaho 826, 831 (2003). "The Court will not extend by implication any
restriction not clearly expressed in the covenants because restrictive covenants are in derogation
of the common law right to use land for all lawful purposes. All doubts must be resolved in favor

of the free use of land." Best Hill Coalition v. HALKO, LLC, 144 Idaho at 817 (emphasis
added).
The clear and logical result is that there are no specific restrictions that run contrary to
I.C. § 63-604(2) and therefore, the Target Property, as well as the rest of the Entire Property,
having met the requirements set forth in I.e. § 63-604, qualifies for the agricultural exemption.
II.

Agricultural Use of Subject Property is Not Prohibited under the City of

Moscow Zoning Code.

A. Local Zoning Designation o(Subject Property Irrelevant
The trial court based its decision in this case solely upon the zoning ofthe Target Property.
The trial court determined that agricultural use was not a permitted use in the Moderate Density,
Medium Density and Multiple Family Residential zones, and therefore the agricultural use was nonconforming. The trial court stated: "the nonconforming agricultural use of the 4.91 acres at issue
here ceased for more than thirty days, and under the clearly stated language of the Moscow City
Zoning Code, its use must have from that time on conformed to the regulations of the Moscow City
Zoning Code as it applies to residential property." (R. Vol. II, pg. 285, P. 2)
The trial inappropriately applied the City of Moscow's Zoning Ordinance to this property.
The zoning designations of the subject property are irrelevant because Idaho Code specifically
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prohibits local zoning ordinances from preventing or closing agricultural operations. The legislature
has gone to great lengths to protect agricultural operations and continues to do so under the Right to
Farm Act found in I.C. § 22-4501 et seq. The legislature wanted to prevent the premature removal
oflands from agricultural uses, and therefore passed legislation that would reduce the loss of those
agricultural resources to the state. Idaho Code § 22-4501 specifically states: "The legislature also
finds that the right to farm is a natural right and is recognized as a permitted use throughout the
state ofIdaho."
To address the potential impact oflocal ordinances on agricultural operations, the
legislature clarified its goal under I.C. § 22-4504, which states:
No city, county, taxing district or other political subdivision of this state
shall adopt any ordinance or resolution that declares any agricultural
operation operated in accordance with generally recognized agricultural
practices to be a nuisance nor shall any zoning ordinance that forces the
closure of any such agricultural operation be adopted. Zoning and
nuisance ordinances shall not apply to agricultural operations that were
established outside the corporate limits of a municipality and then were
incorporated into the municipality by annexation. The county planning
and zoning authority may adopt a nuisance waiver procedure to be
recorded with the county recorder or appropriate county recording
authority pursuant to residential divisions of property. (emphasis added)
Agricultural operation as defined in the Right to Farm Act includes the growing, raising
or production of agricultural crops, including field grains, seeds, and hay (I.C. § 22-4502 (1 )).
Under the Right to Farm Act, agricultural use is a permitted use throughout the State of
Idaho, and any local ordinances which prohibit agricultural use or effectively prevent the
continuation of agricultural operations are unenforceable. The County argued that the Right to
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Farm Act is intended to protect existing farms from nuisance claims. However, to construe such
purpose so narrowly is to disregard the entire language ofI.C § 22-4501. Despite Thompson
Development's arguments, the trial court failed to address the language: "The legislature also finds
that the right to farm is a natural right and is recognized as a permitted use throughout the state of
Idaho."
Further, zoning ordinances do not apply to agricultural operations that were established
outside the corporate limits of a municipality and then were incorporated into the municipality by
annexation. In this case, the subject property has been owned and used for agricultural operations by
the Thompson family for over 58 years. (R. Vol. II, pg. 218, P. 9) The property was previously
located outside the city limits, and was annexed into the city sometime between 1970 and 1981. (R.
Vol. II, pg. 218, P. 11) Accordingly, the zoning ordinance does not apply to this property.
Taken as a whole, it is clear that the Right to Farm Act is intended to prevent counties and
cities from prohibiting agricultural use of property. The Right to Farm Act is not the only statute
which promotes the protection of agricultural activities. The Local Land Use Planning Act was also
intended to encourage protection of agricultural lands for production of food. (I.C. § 67-6502 (e)).
Idaho Code § 67-6529 goes even further and states that no county board of commissioners may
adopt an ordinance or resolution which "deprives any owner of full and complete use of agricultural
land for production of any agricultural product." That code states that 'agricultural land' shall be
defined by local ordinance or resolution. The trial court interprets this to mean that since the City of
Moscow Zoning Code has designated the Target Property as appropriate for residential purposes, it
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inversely means that it is not agricultural land. However, allocating residential zoning districts does
not define agricultural land. Phases II and III both consist of agricultural land, yet are zoned under
the residential zoning districts of the City of Moscow. It is the use of the land which defines it as
agricultural. In this case, the City of Moscow Zoning Code does not apply under the Right to Farm
Act as this is property that was continuously farmed and then annexed into the City.
B. Absent Statutory Authority, Agricultural Use o[Property Would QualifY as a Legal

Noncontorming Use
Even if the legislature had not specifically stated that agricultural use was a permitted use
throughout the state of Idaho under the Right to Farm Act, the local zoning ordinances do not
prohibit Thompson Development from farming its property as a legal non-conforming use. Bill
Belknap, the Community Development Director who also acts as the Zoning Administrator for the
City of Moscow conducted a factual inquiry into the activity of the property, and determined that
Thompson Development was not in violation of the City of Moscow's Zoning Code. Mr. Belknap
appropriately found that the historical use had not been terminated. "Further, no new use was
established that formally extinguished the prior historical agricultural use. Therefore our office finds
that the agricultural use occurring within Indian Hills Sixth Addition is a legal non-conforming use
of the subject property and not in violation of the City's Zoning Code." (R. Vol. II, pg. 224, P. 3)
Title 4, Section 1-8 of the Zoning Code provides for legal non-conforming uses. That code
section provides that a use that was allowed prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance which after
its adoption would no longer be allowed, may continue as a legal nonconforming use. The code
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further states that if the legal non-conforming use is discontinued for a period of30 days, then the
use would no longer qualifY as a legal nonconforming use. The trial court noted that because there
was no agricultural activity observed from the time the property was rezoned in early 2008 through
the fall of 2008 when the property was prepared for spring planting, the agricultural use of the
property no longer qualified under the historic use exception. The trial court further noted that it is
not bound by Mr. Belknap's determination.
However, the trial court failed to take into account two essential factors in its analysis. First,
a crop does not have to be harvested for the property to be continuously used for agricultural
purposes. Idaho Code § 63-604 recognizes this as it allows for agricultural exemptions for
properties which are in a crop retirement or rotation program. (See LC. § 63-604 (1) (a)(iv)). It is
common practice for farmers to allow farm ground to lie fallow for one or more seasons. Second, it
is unreasonable to apply a 30 day time period to agricultural operations when it comes to
determining whether or not a use has been discontinued for purposes of establishing a legal
nonconformity. In a typical crop year, farmland is not ordinarily 'used' for periods of time
exceeding 30 days; for instance, between spring harvest and fall planting. Just because there is not a
crop in the ground, does not mean that the agricultural use of the property has been discontinued as
is anticipated by this code. Mr. Belknap appropriately used reason and logic when he determined
that the 30 day time period noted in Zoning Code Section 1-8 relating to legal nonconforming uses
is not appropriately applied to agricultural uses. Mr. Belknap's interpretation and analysis of Title
4, Section 1-8 of the Zoning Code is nearly identical to this Court's analysis in Roeder Holdings. In

Roeder Holdings, this Court underwent the same process when it reviewed I.e. § 63-602Y. That
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code section stated that property must meet exemption requirements as of the first day of January of
each year the exemption is requested. The county in that case argued that there was no crop in the
ground on January 1, therefore the property was not used for producing field crops and did not
qualifY for the agricultural exemption under I.C. § 63-604. This Court determined that January 1
was not the appropriate date for assessment purposes when it comes to the agricultural exemption
because it is not typical farming practice to have crops in the ground on January 1. Roeder
Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization, 136 Idaho 809, 814 (2001) .
Both Mr. Belknap and this Court in Roeder used a common sense, reasonable analysis
when interpreting the respective code provisions. The same applies in this case. It is not appropriate
to use a 30 day time period for 'use' when it comes to determining if agricultural use offarmland
was discontinued for purposes of establishing a legal nonconformity. In fact, applying the trial
court's and the County's interpretation of the City's Zoning Code in this case would lead to absurd
results; all farmland in the city would be subject to losing their protected non-conforming use rights
solely based upon typical farming practices.

Fortunately, the legislature has clearly stated that agricultural use is permitted throughout
the state of Idaho as a natural right - therefore, the City's Zoning Code, if interpreted to disallow
agricultural uses, is not only a violation of the state code but also of the Idaho Constitution (Article
XII Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, states that an incorporated city may make and enforce
regulations that are not in conflict with the general laws).
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C. De{erence Should be Given to the Zoning Administrator's Decision
During the proceedings below the trial court noted that it is not bound by Mr. Belknap's
detennination that Thompson Development's agricultural use of the subject property was not in
violation of the Zoning Code. Mr. Belknap had issued a letter of detennination in response to a
complaint alleging Thompson Development's agricultural use of the property was a violation of the
City Zoning Code. After a factual investigation, Mr. Belknap noted that Thompson Development's
agricultural use of the property was not in violation of the City's Zoning Code. While the trial court
was correct in that Mr. Belknap's decision was not binding on the trial court; it is well reasoned that
an agency's interpretation of its own zoning regulations should be given deference: " ... 'there is a
strong presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, which includes the
application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances. '" Terrazas v. Blaine County ex.
reI. Board of Commissioners. 147 Idaho at 197,207 P.3d at 173 (2009) (quoting Payette River
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 554, (1999)). This
Court in Chisholm v. Twin Falls County gave deference to that County's interpretation of its own
zoning ordinance articulating the exact same presumption. In that case, this Court detennined
that the County's interpretation was not capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory; and therefore the
Court deferred to the County's interpretation. Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131,
75 P.3d 190 (2003).
While Mr. Belknap is not a 'zoning board', he is the Zoning Administrator tasked by the
City of Moscow's Zoning Code to respond to all questions regarding the interpretation of Moscow's
Zoning Code. (Title 4, Sec. 11-1, Moscow Zoning Code) Also, under Title 4, Section 11-5, the
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Zoning Administrator is tasked with discretion regarding authorized uses. Specifically, that Section
states in part, "Further, when, as a result of subsequent changes in technology, business practice, or
lifestyle, a use has not been mentioned in this Zoning code, the Zoning Administrator or designee
may permit such use if it is clear that the use is comparable to listed uses for a particular zoning
district." In his letter, Mr. Belknap made a point to reference the "compatibility of the nonconforming use with adjacent land uses and the greater public purpose or good of a particular
application of the Zoning Code ... The community and the City have historically promoted the
continuation of farming in locations in and around the City as a productive means of land
stewardship." (R. Vol. II, pg. 224, P. 2) It is clear that under the City of Moscow's Zoning Code, the
Zoning Administrator does have discretion regarding authorized uses and Mr. Belknap's position is
that the agriculture use of the Target Property is not in violation of the City Code.
Mr. Belknap further conducted his own factual investigation prior to making his
determination. Like the County in Chisholm, Mr. Belknap's interpretation was not capricious,
arbitrary or discriminatory. As such, his decision should be given deference. In this case, the state
legislature has effectively removed all questions regarding the interpretation of local ordinances on
agricultural operations and therefore Mr. Belknap's determination, while appropriately reasoned and
accurate as presented, is pre-empted by state code.
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III.

Prohibiting agricultural use of the Target Property by application of the City

of Moscow Zoning Code is a violation of Thompson Development's due process rights.

As noted above, in the event the City of Moscow's Zoning Code does apply, Thompson
Development's use of the Target Property for agricultural operations is protected as a nonconforming use. The 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, Sec.
13 of the Idaho Constitution both protect an individual's right to continue a "nonconforming
use". Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 244 P.3d 174, 178 (2010) (quoting O'Connor v. City of
Moscow. 69 Idaho 37, 42-43, (1949). A nonconforming use is "a use ofland which lawfully
existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and which is maintained after the effective
date of the ordinance even though not in compliance with use restrictions." Id. (quoting Baxter v.
City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-09 (] 989). Generally, nonconforming uses are allowed to
continue after a new zoning ordinance is enacted. Id This is intended to protect "the owner from
abrupt termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity on the property. The
protection does not extend beyond this purpose." Id. (quoting Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104
Idaho 307, 309 (Ct App. 1983)) In general, nonconforming uses "should not be allowed to
expand and eventually should be eliminated." Ada County v. Schemm, 96 Idaho 396, 398
(1974).
Accordingly, a nonconforming use may be lost if it is enlarged or expanded in violation
of a valid zoning ordinance. Baxter, 115 Idaho at 609. This Court in Baxter adopted a flexible
approach that focuses on the character of the alleged enlargement or expansion on a case-by-case
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basis.Id. In that analysis this Court focused on the particular character of the nonconforming use
and whether the use was the same before or after the passage of the zoning ordinance. Id.
This Court in Eddins reiterated the intent of due process:
Due process protects the fundamental or primary use of the property prior to the
enactment of a new zoning ordinance; therefore, a nonconforming use is not
impermissibly enlarged or expanded until there has been some change in the fundamental
or primary use of the property. Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 178 (2010)

This Court in Eddins found that the fundamental or primary use of Eddins' real property
both before and after the ordinance was passed

was to rent spaces for manufactured homes

and recreational vehicles. In which case, the use of the real property was protected by the due
process clauses ofIdaho and the U.S. Constitutions. Id. at 179.
This Court found that including the manufacturing of crypts in the operation of a
cemetery was an intensification of its use, but was not a basic change in the fundamental or
primary use of the real property in question. Lewis-Clark Memorial Gardens, Inc., v. City of
Lewiston, 99 Idaho 680, 680 (1978).
This Court also found that replacement of obsolescent equipment with modem equipment
for a business did not constitute an enlargement or expansion of that use. Gordon Paving Co. v.
Blaine Cty. Bd ofCty. Comm'rs, 98 Idaho 730, 731 (1977). This Court pointed out "[b]oth
before and after the modifications [the paving company] was engaged in asphalt production by
the same basic process. As a matter oflaw, no change of use has occurred." Id. at 732.
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The main issue consistent in Lewis-Clark Memorial Gardens, Gordon Paving, and

Eddins is the focus on whether the uses constituted enlargement or expansion of the
nonconforming use. In Thompson Development's case, there is no enlargement or expansion of
use. In fact, there is arguably a decrease in the use because portions of the property that were
previously farmed were dedicated to the City for public streets, which decreased the size of the
land used for agricultural operations. It is important to note, the property subject to the tax appeal
is only the property owned by Thompson Development, and does not include the streets or rights
of way.
The trial court stated that Thompson Development terminated its agricultural activities on
the Target Property, and that Thompson Development's termination of agricultural activities
constituted a fundamental change in use. (R. Vol. II, pg. 288, P. 4). However, this is inconsistent
with this Court's analysis in Eddins and Baxter.
There is no dispute that Thompson Development farmed the Target Property prior to the
change in the zoning of the property in early 2008. There is no dispute that the Target Property
was prepped for farming in the fall of 2008 and farmed in the subsequent years. There was no
harvesting of any crop in the summer of 2008 while the public improvements were installed.
However, the character of the use of the property before 2008 and in the fall of2008 was the
same with the exception that there was a little less ground for Thompson Development to farm as
the platting required the dedication of public rights of way. While some utilities were stubbed
out along the boundaries of the lots, they did not interfere with the farming of the Target
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Property. There was no other use of the Target Property between the beginning of 2008 and the
fall of2008. This is the same analysis used by Mr. Belknap when he made his determination: the
fundamental and primary use of the Target Property has not changed.
Because there was clearly no enlargement, expansion, or change in the fundamental or
primary use of the Target Property, Thompson Development's nonconforming use is protected
by the due process clauses of the Idaho Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. Based upon
Thompson Development's right to continue farming the property, and meeting aU of the
requirements set forth in LC. § 63-604, Thompson Development is entitled to receive the
agricultural exemption.
IV.

The trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Thompson Development
an agricultural exemption on the Target Property.

Based upon the foregoing, the trial Court erred as a matter of law in denying Thompson
Development an agricultural exemption on the Target Property.
CONCLUSION

Thompson Development was entitled to receive the agricultural exemption for the Target
Property, having qualified for the exemption under LC. § 63-604 for the tax years 2009 and
2010. Thompson Development paid $59,476.48 in additional taxes due to the erroneous denial of
the agricultural exemption. (R. VoL I, pg. 75, P. 19) The tax was improperly or illegally assessed
and collected. This Court should enter an order directing a refund to Thompson Development in
the amount of $59,476.48. (LC. § 63-3812(c)). This Court should enter ajudgment and order for
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a refund - this is not discretionary but rather is mandatory once an improper assessment and
overpayment is found. Canyon County Bd. of Egualization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., LLC,
143 Idaho 58, 62 (2006). Thompson Development is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on
the overpayments, from the date of payment. Id. at 62-63; I.e. § 63-1305(2).

DATED: January 10,2012.

Respectfully submitted,
SUSAN R. WILSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC

Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
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Property Thompson farmed, owned
by other parties*

Property owned* and farmed by Petitioner
as of January 1,2009
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BEFORE THE IDAHO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEALS OF IDAHO
TRUST DEEDS, LLC from the decisions of the
Board of Equalization of Twin Falls County for tax
year 200B.

)
)
)

APPEAL NOS. 08-A-2787
thru OB-A-2B10

)
)

FINAL DECISION
AND ORDER

AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION APPEALS
THESE MATIERS came on for consolidated hearing November 7, 2008 in Twin Falls,
Idaho before Hearing Officer Steven Wallace. The full Board participated in this decision.
Attorney Gary Slette and Managing Member Rick Giesler appeared for Idaho Trust Deeds, LLC.
Assessor Gerry Bowden, County Prosecutor Matt Pember and Appraiser Supervisor John
Knapple appeared for Respondent Twin Falls County. These appeals are taken from decisions
of the Twin Falls County Board of Equalization (BOE) denying the protests of valuation fortaxing
purposes of properties described by parcel no. on Attachment A.

The issue on appeaJ is whether farmed ground qualifies as exempt pursuant to
Section 63-604, I.C., or what is the proper taxable value of exempt "land actively devoted
to agriculture" pursuant to Section 63-602K.
The decisions of the Twin Falls County Board of Equalization are modified in part
and reversed in part.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The subject property is 25 "unsold" residential lots in two (2) newer subdivisions, Belmont
Stakes and Emerald Heights. All the subject lots, plus some adjoining non subdivision land, are
tenant farmed. According to the record, the subdivisions' CC&R's do not restrict the present
agricultural use. Platted roadways within the subdivisions are developed and owned by the
government The subject lots are generally at, or a little over, one (1) acre in size.
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The County found 21 lots had a boundary line, or point contact, in common with other
same-ownership land where the total area involved was overtive (5) acres. These 21 lots were
exempted pursuant to Section 63-604, I.C.. On these exempt lots Appellant objects to the
taxable value determination, claiming an over-assessment.
On the other four (4) subject lots, the County held they were not exempt where the
contiguous land area was determined to be under fIVe (5) acres. On these non exempted lots
Appellant seeks the agricultural exemption and a fair determination of taxable value. Taxpayer
contends the exception in Section 63-604(7)(a) applies to these lots. Consequently the four (4)
lots should be considered for assessment purposes to be "contiguous" with other sameownership land, which all taken together has a total contiguous land area that exceeds the 5-acre
threshold.
Taxpayer contends the subject subdivision land should be valued the same as any other
qualifying cropland, i.e. pursuant to the actual-use-value model provided for in the agricultural
exemption law. The installation of subdivision improvements and the subsequent impact on
individual lot values is contended to be a non factor in the determination of taxable value under
the agricultural exemption. The subdivision improvements considered by the Assessor included
improved streets and utility lines within those roadways.
The Assessor calculated an agricultural land value of$1 ,333 per acre. This was the figure
based solely on the statutory and rule formula. The legal formula is complex. It is summarized
here as a "use-value" based on a specially modified income approach, where income is tied to
I

a soil type's agricultural production. Land immediately outside the subdivision, that was farmed
in conjunction with the subdivision ground, had a total assessed value of $1 ,333 per acre. But
where the 21 Jots were serviced by subdivision improvements, the calculation of taxable value
-2-
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differed substantially - going as high as $54,000 to $66,000 each for the roughly i-acre lots.
Respondent reported it had granted an agricultural exemption to the 21 lots.

Without the

agricultural exemption, market value estimates for the 21 lots ranged from about $64,000 to
$76,000 each.
In assessing the 21 lots, the Assessor adapted a method of valuation used for non exempt
subdivision ground. The subdivision market valuation model allocated a percentage of total
value to various components. For instance, the land cost in a rural subdivision was typically
found to represent 17% of the total subdivision development costs, utilities were 18%, and so on.
To grant the agricultural exemption, Le. remove the "speculative value", the County removed
17% from its full market value estimates for each lot; then replaced the 17% reduction with the
special use valuation. This produced a taxable value that reflected both the agricultural use plus
value attributable to the presence of subdivision improvements.
Respondent's explanation for this special treatment of agricultural land in subdivisions
implied the improvements were actually located on the lots and owned by the lot Dwner(s). From
the record however, this did not appear to be the case. Regardless, the tenant farming evidently
continued right up to, or across, the lot boundary lines.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Board's goal in its hearings is the acquisition of sufficient, accurate evidence to
support a determination of fair market value or as here exempt status and taxable value. This
Board, giving ' full opportunity for all arguments and having considered all testimony and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties in support of their respective positions, hereby
enters the following.
Property is presumed taxable un less expressly exempted. Idaho Code Sections 63-203,
-3-
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63-602. Several rules apply in determ ining whether property is entitled to an exemption. Statutes
granting tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the State. Tax
exemptions are narrowly construed, following the "strict but reasonable" rule of statutory
construction. Ada County Bd. of Equalization v. Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202 at 206; 108 P.3d
349 at 353 (2005).
Subdivision roadways were in public ownership for both platted subdivisions germane to
this matter (Belmont Stakes and Emerald Heights). Where a roadway separated privately owned
lots from one another, the County found the separated lots were not "contiguous" as the private
ownerships did not meet at the center of the street. Thus the County found four (4) lots did not
qualify for the agricultural exemption due to size standards. We hold the County reading of
Section 63-602K(7)(a) was in error. The section provides:
(7) As used in this section:
(a) "Contiguous" means being in actual contact or touching along a boundary or
at a point, except no area of land shall be considered not contiguous solely by
reason of a roadway or other right-of-way.
The roadway exception would be superfluous language or a meaningless clause as
interpreted by the County. If same-owner parcels went to the centerline of a street or right of way
from opposite sides, then those ownerships would "touch" under the first phrase meaning. The
County believed the second phrase applied only under the same circumstances as the first, i.e.
where a "touch" occurred. The "exception" phrase must be interpreted to alter or qualify the first
part under the expressed circumstaf!ces. It is an exception, i.e. it applies where common
ownerships do not touch solely by reason of a roadway or other right-of-way.
The four (4) non exempted lots were contiguous with one another through common
boundaries and ownerships.
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Therefore the BOE decision to not exempt four (4) of the subject lots will be reversed.
The other issue on appeal dealt with the proper calculation of taxable value under the
agricultural exemption. As noted earlier, the County started with an estimate of the full market
value for each lot, then made a 17% deduction, then added back an agricultural land value. We
hold the agricultural land value should have been calculated pursuant to the statutory scheme
and that this figure alone represented the taxable value of subject lots. See Section 63-602K,
I.C. and Property Tax Administrative Rules 613, 614 and 645 in IDAPA 35.01.03.
The taxable value of land actively devoted to agriculture is closely controlled.
mechanics of determining taxable value on this partial exemption are complex.

The

It is clear

however that the "actual use value" or taxable value is not determined by reference to market
value, but by statute and rule procedure/formula. The speculative portion value results from
comparing the statutory formula value, Le. the taxable value, with the property's full market value,
The pertinent exemption law does not provide for or allow a taxable value calculation as
processed by the County. The record provided the subject lots were farmed over their surface
area. There was no indication that subdivision improvements prevented farming.
For the reasons set forth above, the decisions of the Twin Falls County Board of
Equalization concerning subject lots will be reversed in part and modified in part.
FINAL ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing Final Decision, IT IS ORDERED that the decisions of the
Twin Falls County Board of Equalization concerning the subject parcels be, and the same hereby
are, REVERSED in part to grant exemptions and set taxable values on four (4) lots, and
-5-
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MODIFIED in part to reduce taxable values on the remaining 21 lots. See Attachment A for
specific taxable values ordered by the Board.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any taxes which have been paid in excess of those
determined to have been due be refunded or applied against other ad valorem taxes due from
Appellant.
DATED February 27, 2009

Attachment A
Before the Board of Tax: Appeals

Idaho Trust Deeds, LLC Appeals - Twin Falls County
Appeal No.1. OB-21. OB-A-2B06
22. 08-A-2B07
1. 08-A-27B6
2. 08-A-2787

23. 08-A-280B

3. 08-A-2788

24.08-A-2B09

4. 08-A-2789

25. 08-A-281 0

5. OB-A-2790

6. 08-A-2791
7. 08-A-2792

B. 08-A-2793
9. 08-A-2794
10. 08-A-2795
11. 08-A-2796
12. 08-A-2797
13. 08-A-2798
14.08-A-2799
15. 08-A-2800
16. 08-A-2801
17. 08-A-2802
18. 08-A-2803
19. 08-A-2804
20. 08-A-2805
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Parcel No.

value set at $1,333
J;FPOF3090000070A

modified, value set at $1,335

]RPOF1530000220A

modified, value set at $1,349

~POF1530000240A

modified, value set at $3,779

CRPOF1530000210A

. modified, value set at $1,349

rRPOF1530000200A

modified, value set at $1,375

QRPOF1530000190A

modified, value set at $1,338

§f(POF1530000180A

modified, value set at $1,380

r RPOF1530000170A

reversal, value set at $1,346

l RPOF1530000160A

reversal, value set at $1,343

\RPOF1530000150A

reversal, value set at $1,340

gRPOF1530000140A

reversal, value set at $1,338

1RPOF1530000120A

modified, value set at $1,879

yRPOF1530000110A

modified, value set at $1,338

§f(POF1530000090A

modified, value set at $1,828

RP016210030090A RPOF1530000080A

modified, value set at $1,610

withdrawn/dis RPOF1530000070A

modified, value set at $1,607

missed

RPOF1530000060A

modified, value set at $1,335

RPOF309000001 OA RPOF1530000050A

modified, value set at $1,335

modified,

modified, value set at $1,333

RPOF1530000040A

value set at
$1,354
RPOF3090000020A
modified,
value set at $1,335
RPOF3090000030A
modified,
value set at
$1,335
RPOF3090000050A
modified,
value set at
$1,354
RPOF3090000060A
modified,
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